AN EMERGENT THEORY OF
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
BASED UPON AN EPIGENETIC MODEL
Clare W.
Graves
There is no
pretension, on my part, that the mode to be utilized in this paper or the
theory to be presented is THE MODEL or THE THEORY OF ethical behavior. The
model and the theory represent in my mind principles upon which we may open the
way for more systematic investigation of ethical behavior than has been allowed
by models and theories previously developed. However, it should be said that
there is behind the thoughts in this paper the firm belief that somewhere
within the boundaries delineated will arise insights closer to the truth of
what ethical behavior is and is like than have been provided by models or
theories previously presented.
This paper
will lift the concept of epigenesis from embryology and will apply it to the
field of ethics. The theory will be derived from the organismic point of view
of Rousseau, Smuts, Schweitzer, Lecky, Goldstein, Maslow, et. al.
These will be reinterpreted within Krech’s concept of
Dynamic Neurological Systems and the General Systems point of view of Bertalanffy. The paper will proceed as follows:
First, I
shall express the reasons why a different model and a different theory are
needed.
Then, I
will defend this position by a limited examination of existing models and
existing theories.
Next, from
the examination of models previously used and theories previously expressed I
shall derive the criteria which must be met by a more adequate theory of
ethical behavior.
And in
turn, I will present more details as to my theoretical position, why this position
is taken, my basic assumptions, how I am attempting to conceive of ethical behavior,
the proposed model for representing ethical behavior and the proposed theory of
ethical behavior.
A
subsequent paper will present the author’s speculations as to the nature of the
emergent ethical systems hypothesized therein.
First, let
us see why new models are needed.
". . .
if we demand that the study of human morals be a closely
integrated synthesis of empirical data with a rigorous theory underlying it,
then we have not taken the first step toward a science of character (1, p.
410)."
". . .
if we are to solve the problems of peace and war between alliances, ideologies,
nations, labor and management; if we are to solve the problems of race
relations, character development, crime and the like, we must recognize that
they will be solved only by the decisions of individuals and only if the
decisions are based on substantive knowledge and only if the individuals who
make such decisions are ethically sensitive and ethically mature (2, p )." (Slightly modified by the
writer).
These words of Bonner and the World Book of encyclopedia indicates two reasons why we need additional
theories of ethical behavior based upon different models. (In a subsequent
paper describing the theorized ethical systems other reasons will be discussed).
First, as
Bonner says, we do not have a basic scientific knowledge of ethics and second,
as the other words say, we can’t make inroads into ethical problems because we
lack the knowledge necessary to solve such problems.
Some will
disagree with these points because they do not believe our problem is to find
what ethical behavior is like. These people believe our problem is to learn how
to develop the ethically sensitive and ethically mature decision maker. There
is no doubt that many people assume that they know what ethical behavior is and
it is true that these people are trying to produce what they consider to be the
ethically mature decision maker.
Some, like Blatz ( ), see values as arbitrarily determined by the
older generation and see the task for those wishing to produce ethically mature
decision makers to consist of choosing the desired set of values, then setting
out relentlessly to stamp them in.
Others such
as Ligon and his co-workers take a more cautious approach.
They have subscribed to a set of ethical values which they believe if
incorporated would produce the ethically mature and ethically sensitive human
being. Unlike those who try to relentlessly stamp in prescribed values the
Character Research Project is carefully attempting to determine how to
gradually develop the so called embryonic and fetal conditions and attitudes
which would lead eventually to the mature ethical values of the ethically
sensitive decision makers.
Perhaps ethical
values are not arbitrarily determined. Perhaps we are wrong when we say the
Communists are unethical. Perhaps we don’t have the knowledge necessary to
understand their ethical systems. Perhaps we could handle our problems with
them better if we
understood
their ethics. Perhaps we could make more progress in many areas if we sought
knowledge of what ethical behavior is like rather than continue to operate
within what may be false premises.
There are
those who will say that these arguments are ridiculous and this they will
support by pointing to the libraries laden down with tomes on ethics.
Surely, one
must agree, that there is no shortage of information as to what people feel is
ethical behavior or feel about ethical behavior, but one must ask how much of
this information is more than argument, opinion or just a priority presumptive?
An
examination of this literature supported Bonner’s statement that there is a
dearth of information about ethical behavior which is based upon systematic
research. And an investigation of this material suggested five reasons why
systematic research based information is scarce.
1. Many believe ethical behavior cannot or
should not be explored scientifically.
2. For some reasons investigators have chosen to study limited
aspects of ethical behavior.
3. Some
believe, as just noted, that they know what is ethical
behavior and thus believe that the only task in ethics is to learn how
to produce the ethically mature person.
4. Most
theories presented are not open to systematic testing or even to systematic
comparison.
5. Models
which exist restrict full and broad, let the chips fall where they may, types
of investigation.
For
centuries many have believed that ethical behavior is not open to scientific
investigation. This belief exists today and even in the most fertile of
scientific minds. Ethical behavior is and has been to many a "verboten"
scientific area because these people place it beyond the realm of man and in
the realm of metaphysics or the realm of God.
This
position was well represented recently when a physicist friend of mine asked:
"Are you certain this is a proper field of study for psychologists? Are you
not invading God’s realm?" To this a psychologist has but one answer. Psychologists
study behavior and one form of behavior is ethical behavior. Much of the
research that has been done has been limited to narrow regions of ethical
behavior. One thinks, herein, of the Hartshone-May
"Studies in Deceit" and the work of Piaget. Other research work has been
directed toward uncovering the principles for developing, from a priori
assumptions the ethically mature person. Again we
point out
that Ligon’s Union College Character Research Project
is representative of the latter type of research. These, and other not
mentioned studies, suggest that investigators have been either disinterested in
broad systematic explorations of ethical behavior or have been, for some
reasons, unwilling, unable, or reluctant to design broad studies which would
allow the
facts
regarding ethical behavior to fall where they may.
There are
so many diverse theories of ethical behavior that it is doubtful if anyone can
bring order to all that have been presented. Yet, if we are to learn from them
so as to develop more adequate models, more representative theories, some order
has to be impressed on them. The criterion chosen for ordering is
dissimilarity, a criterion which when applied parcels out at least four kinds
of markedly dissimilar theories.
Single Principle Ethical Theorists
Each of
these theorists formulates his principle of morality and each attempts to
distinguish between right and wrong with reference to that principle. Those who
have contributed single principle or absolutistic ethical theories are legion,
to mention one would only be to slight another. In general the theorists
dominated thought about ethical behavior up through the eighteenth century and
also into much of the nineteenth century.
The problem
with the single principle theories is that they are carefully reasoned opinions
but are, by and large, not open to research investigators and thus are not open
to disproof.
The Many Moralities Theorists
The representative
theorist here is of course, Nietzsche. The difference between the
Nietzsche-like theorists and the single-principle theorists is clear and
distinct. The many moralities theorists insist that there are many moralities
which are actually mores and not morals. They are mores not moralities because
they are relative to culture.
But – the
difference between the multiple morality theorists and the single principle
theorists involve more than this one point. The multiple moralities theorists
see a different approach to the problem of understanding moral behavior. Their
problem is not what is the principle of morality, but
rather, what are the answers to two questions. What is the natural history of
each morality? And, are there commonalities from one set of mores or ethics to
another set or mores or ethics?
In a
scientific sense those who share the Nietzsche position have advanced over the
single principle theorists. The multiple moralities position allows for
empirical findings, for the possibility of disproof and it allows the
possibility of prediction. Yet, from another angle the Nietzsche-like position
presents problems. It argues that moral judgments are not fact but only
feelings which are in turn symptoms of most valuable facts concerning cultures.
This position may lead and mislead at one and the same time. The many
moralities theorists see that ethics are symptomatic but they may lead us to
the wrong conclusion as to what it is they are symptomatic of. Furthermore,
these theorists have not gone on to design models consistent with their
position; they have not gone on to draw hypotheses which could stem from such a
model; they have not gone on to extensively test their hypothesized position
and they have not gone on to reconstruct their theory as new evidence has come
to be.
Drop Moral Philosophy and Develop Moral Science
Theorists
The primary proponents of this point of view
are the pragmatists with John Dewey, of course, the representative contributor.
Dewey’s position is, beyond question, different from the single principle
theorists:
"Why
have men become so attached to fixed, external ends?" he asked and he saw
this reliance on the idea of fixed ends as the common element in most ethical
theories and he criticized it strongly. He related how each theorist in his
quest for certainty had been "hypnotized" by the notion that the
business of ethics is to discover some final end or basic good or some ultimate
and supreme law.
Dewey
argues also for a change to the modern scientific theory of nature. He
expressed a desire to see moral philosophy become moral science, a body of
knowledge consisting of testable hypotheses as to what is good for man, and he
asked that this knowledge be open to continuous revision. Moral science would
then be directed toward what is good for man, namely, his social welfare. But
here we see our problem with the pragmatists. What is good for man? What is
good for his welfare?
Dewey and
the pragmatists leave such unanswered and at this point the Emotivists enter.
The Twentieth Century Emotivists
Ethical emotivism claims that moral judgments
are meaningless and should be viewed as neither true or
false. Ethical judgments express one’s feelings about what is right and wrong,
but ethical judgments do not tell in any way what is right and what is wrong.
It is with the latter point, of the Emotivists
that one takes exception, though one must point out
the criticism may be unfair. It is made not because it is an established valid
criticism but because it enables one to make a point concerning what those who
develop models of ethical behavior must keep in mind.
Let us
grant that ethical judgments in no way tell us what is right or what is wrong.
This seems obvious but this is not the point. The point is that if we develop
models which enable us to explore what people judge as right and wrong, what
people make what particular judgments, the circumstances under which they make
them, the conditions which accompany change in judgments as to right and wrong,
etc., we may find that "integrated synthesis of empirical data" and
that "rigorous theory underlying it" which Bonner says is needed
before we are to have that "science of character" he and Allport among others, see so needed.
Actually I
do not believe that Emotivists will disagree with what has just been said. On
the contrary, it is probable that they do agree and that they have taken their
position to indicate a need. They may be indicating that no theory of ethical
behavior can have substance which does not consider their point of view and
that no research model can provide adequate research projects which is not an
inclusive model or in the words of Bronner:
“These
widely used models do not convincingly represent man’s moral nature for they
either neglect or do not pretend to account for man’s future oriented behavior.
“(1,p. )
These widely used models are:
The Mechanical Model,
The Phylogenetic Model, and
The Genetic Model.
The Mechanical Model sees ethical behavior as derived from
and determined by the outer
power utilizing reward, punishment and the principle
of reinforcement. Good moral behavior results from stamped in habit patterns
developed by repeated reward. Bad moral behavior results from failure to reward
properly or punish adequately. It is an external model which
in no ways accounts for ethical acts that occur without reward. And this
Mechanical Model excludes the self-concept or inner urgencies as playing any
part in ethical behavior.
The Phylogenetic Model sees ethical behavior as bringing
together certain needs in the self and certain socially acceptable actions.
Primary drives are converted into, let us say, secondary moral drives. Needs
become connected to socially accepted forms of behavior. This model allows some
room for man to be expressive, but it is weak because it is harnessed, not
released moral expressiveness.
The
Genetic Model,
following
its psychoanalytic parent, sees moral behavior arising from infantile and
childhood experiences. The problem of producing moral behavior is the
problem of sublimating man’s animalism into ethical behavior. It sees man only
as another animal and sees man as one which is fundamentally more similar
rather than less similar to other animals. Such a position may be correct, but
certainly Woodworth’s principle of behavior primacy over need primacy and Krech and Crutchfield’s concepts of deficiency and
abundancy motivation challenge the orthodox psychoanalytic genetic model.
So too, do
the concepts expressed in the contributions of Lecky,
Goldstein, Jung, Maslow, and by no means let us not
forget MacDougall’s instinct and Allport’s
"Becoming."
Allport in his writings on
"Becoming" and Bonner (1, p. 409) in his "Psychology of
Personality" offer, a fourth model, The Intentional Model, as a
more appropriate explanation of ethical behavior.
The Intentional Model says:
"In moral choices and discriminations we do not always act on the
basis of social concern, but on the basis of the capacity to foresee the
consequences of our own acts. The more mature a person’s moral acts, the more
he moves on a plane of future orientation. Moral habits are not mechanical
responses merely, nor are they largely instrumentalities for the satisfaction
of needs; they are both. But we cannot rest the case of ethical discrimination
on the impelling force of habit, either instrumental or socially driven. The
moral conscience of man is unique in being basically self-propelled."
The Intentional Model seems to explain some aspects of
morality better than do other models, but there may be two problems inherent in
it. First, will the research data existing today support that "the moral
conscience of ALL men is unique in being basically self-propelled?" This
criticism may be unfair because the quotation above does recognize morality as
partially derived from "habit" and as partially
"instrumentalities for the satisfaction of needs." But, one must ask:
Does this model recognize that moralities may be also reaction formation
transformation of some tendencies?
Another criticism of The Intentional Model is less a criticism
and more an extension of the model as I understand it. It does not appear that The
Intentional Model, as it has been presented, spells out how morality ay
change in a systematic way as man’s intentions systematically reorganize.
Certainly both Allport and Bonner, in other writings,
recognize, possibly more than anyone else, that today’s motivations are not
just a new reenactment of an old theme. However, it seems that they do not
include development directionality in these changes.
The following problem with The Intentional Model may be more
crucial, but, again, one cannot be certain that the criticism to follow is
just. It is difficult to ascertain how the following statement of Bonner (1, p.
409) should be interpreted when one looks at the behavior of Castro and the
condemning behavior of the leaders of the
Bonner says:
"A times comes in the life of every
individual when his image of himself is a more powerful determinant of his
moral actions than the threatening admonitions of parent, teacher, clergyman,
or politician."
And one might add the threatening
admonitions of one of nation’s leaders to another nation’s leaders when the
former nation sees the latter nation as behaving in a morally errant fashion.
Does this aspect of the The
Intentional Model mean that Castro’s purging of Batistaites
was moral because his image of himself as the savior of
It is above all, this dilemma in The Intentional Model, plus the
weakness of those other models, which lies behind my feeling that some other
model of ethical behavior is needed. Some model is needed which includes those
aspects of morality represented in The Mechanical, The
Phylogenetic, The Genetic and The Intentional Models. A conception of
ethical behavior is needed which will explain why Castro sees his actions as
morally proper, and one is needed which will at the same time explain why our
nation’s people and our leaders have seen just as honestly his actions as
morally reprehensible.
And may I add one thing: The conception must not be the time honored
worn out and chaotic culturally relativistic explanation. The explanation must
be more profound.
A more adequate conception must explain how two phenomenologically
different individuals, clans, societies or nations can see the same act as
moral and immoral and this explanation must be better than one based on
cultural differences. The question we must ask is: How can we conceive of
ethical behavior so that two groups can see the same act differently without
getting lost in social relativism? That is, upon which criteria can a model be based which will include at least partial solutions to
the problems that have just been detailed? It appears that a more adequate
theory must meet at least the following criteria.
Criteria for a Model of Ethical Behavior
1. It must not concentrate on some one element and aspect of moral
experience as if
it alone could serve as a standard for
evaluation of the rest. (p. 600)
2. An adequate theory must be truly scientific. It must seek
knowledge of the thing to
be known and not some other thing, the ethical
behavior of man. It must not
destroy moral experience in order to make it fit
previously established forms of
factual science and it must not set up morality s
transcendent and exalted above
human lives, as for
example, some person’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s
superman.
3. It must include all other conceptions of ethical behavior
because such are some of
the data regarding ethics.
4. It must include the problems of whether things are infinite or
finite.
5. It must recognize that certain people do feel that there are
right and wrong ways
to behave.
6. It must allow one to develop, test and revise hypotheses.
7. It must enable one to describe ethical behavior in
some orderly way.
8. It must allow one to systematically examine for and seek
explanations for the
nature and arisal of ethical value systems.
The theory presented tries to meet these criteria, though it may not
meet criteria of which others would think. But before we examine it the reader
should know the author’s theoretical position so that we can peruse the theory
within the writer’s theoretical framework as well as from within his own.
My basic theoretical orientation within psychology is the organismic
position as represented by Goldstein, Lecky, Angyal et. al., wedded to the personalistic point of view of Stern, G. W. Allport et. al.
I do not react against or deny the validity of the conditioning theorists, the
various psychoanalytic theorists or any other theoretical position existent
today. The difference is that the latter are seen as the more
narrow, more exclusive of all aspects of human behavior while the former
are seen as the more widely encompassing, more inclusive of the many aspects of
human behavior.
Thus, I have assumed that ethical
behavior, like any other behavior, grows and changes with time.
Like any other growth, it may
progress, regress, fixate or change. It is assumed that there is something of
an inherent ethical nature in man which is triggered into operation as one or
another ethical system in one or another form by certain life circumstances.
Also, it is assumed that as a growth phenomenon. ethical
behavior develops naturally through definable but overlapping stages. This being an orderly progression from a less complex to a more
complex stage.
And, like any other growth
phenomenon, it has been assumed that there is no assurance once growth starts that subsequent stages will emerge.
Ethical behavior could, like a seed, grow through all its natural stages
to its ultimate mature form or, like the seed, ethical behavior could become
stunted or even reorganize and take on a form not usually of its nature.
Then finally it was assumed that
just as the seed must have favorable living circumstances to flower fully, so
too is man’s ethical potential limited by the life circumstances in which the
human develops.
These assumptions led to the search for a model which would represent
the phenomenology assumed and the conceptual ways of representing such.
This essay asserts that we cannot find the schematic basis for
constructing a model within the world of philosophical or religious thought nor
in the more generally accepted approaches to science. It says that
we must look elsewhere, which is why
the model is developed from within the ways of thinking of General Systems
theorists.
General Systems Theory promotes the appearance of
structural similarities or isomorphies in different fields. It looks for
correspondences In the principles which govern the
behavior of entities which are intrinsically, widely different.
General Systems Theory permits one to view behavior as an ordered evolution from some less
organized state to some more organized state. It allows one to view the final
state as being reached from different initial conditions. It allows one to
think in terms of movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Thus it allows
one to think of systems which develop toward states of greater heterogeneity
and complexity while, at the same time, one thinks of states which maintain
steady conditions moving steadily to the ultimate of that particular state.
Since this way of thinking seemed to correspond with my observations and
with my thinking
in respect to ethical behavior, it was natural
that the model presented should be developed within General Systems Theory.
Having settled on the broad theoretical basis for the model, the need
arose for more specific conceptions within which the thinking could be ordered.
A concept was needed which expressed that a particular, yet variable, resultant
(an ethical system) arises when certain forces meet at a particular moment in
time. This concept had to allow, also, for the abnormal over and
underdevelopment of the particular resultant (a particular ethical system). The
concept needed seemed to be much like that of epigenesis, a concept in the
field of embryology.
The interpretation of epigenesis that all which grows has an ordered
ground plan, not always achieving its final form, yet if achieving this final
form, still infinitely variable, fitted well three specific conceptual needs.
1. The need to represent ethical behavior as a growth phenomenon.
2. The need to represent organized intermediate stages on the way
to later stages.
3. The need to represent conceptually the idea that stage might
fail adequately to
develop or might display a
monstrous over-development.
At this point, two other conceptual problems remained.
There was a need to conceptualize the factors which operate within the
person to determine the ethical systems. In particular such factors as need, or
motives, emotional factors and cognitive factors needed to be represented, and
there was a need to represent the life circumstances which trigger the inherent
ethical nature assumed. Since it did not seem wise, in terms of current trends
in psychological theory, to use the idea of the interaction of motivational,
emotional, cognitive and experiential factors, a concept was sought within
which all of these could be subsumed.
It was Krech’s ( ) concept of Dynamic
Systems which seemed best to fulfill this conceptual need. The need to
represent triggering environmental conditions was met by borrowing the concept
of the releasor from the ethologists.
Thus the model for emergent ethical theory is the thought of General
Systems Theory, the Epigenetic concept, the concept of Dynamic
Neurological Systems and the concept of Releasor. Utilizing this
model Emergent Ethical Theory proposes the following:
1.
That
the ethical system of a man or a group of men is a
function
of the dynamic system triggered by the life
circumstances in which that man or that group of men
are
living.
2.
That
normally the system of ethical behavior by which a
man or a
group of men lives changes in an orderly
determined
manner as broader dynamic systems
are
triggered by more humanly favorable life circumstances.
3.
That
there emerges an ethical thema of what is right and
what is
wrong in behavior which is appropriate to each
level of
dynamic emergence.
4.
That
within each thema certain specific values of right and
wrong
will be expressed by one man or group of men
because
of variations in the components of a dynamic
system
while another man or group of men may
accentuate
certain other values because of a different
arrangement
in the dynamic system.
5.
That
there is a natural driveness in man to proceed from a
lower to
a higher level dynamic system and thus a
concomitant
natural driveness to move from a lower,
more
humanly restricting, conception of right and wrong
to a higher,
more humanly freeing conception of right
and
wrong.
6.
That
as man moves from a lower to a higher level of ethical
behavior
some values by which man judges right from
wrong are
discarded as no longer appropriate to his
changed
status; that some of the earlier values are
retained
intact; that some previous values are modified;
and that
some new, not previously existing conceptions
of right
and wrong emerge as each subsequent dynamic
system
emerges.
7.
That
the ethical systems by which men live may progress,
fixate at
an over or underdeveloped stage; may regress, may
become a monstrum in defectu or a monstrum in excessu.
The
movement, lack of movement, or abnormalcy of
movement
is a function of the conditions which effect man’s
psychological dynamic system. Fear, for example, as it
restricts
man’s cognitive field can drive him to living by
lower
level ethics.
8.
That
lower level dynamics produces a more rigid ethical system
thus
making it impossible for those living by lower ethics
to
comprehend the meaning of living by higher level ethics.
The theory suggests that under life circumstances A{c}, when dynamical
system A{d} is met with releasor conditions A{r} that
the ethical state of affairs A will arise. Stage A would be one or no morality.
When phenomenological conditions change and factors B{lc}, B{d} and B{r} are present the M thema of ethical
behavior will arise.
Then as factors C{lc}, C{d} and C{r} come to
exist ethical behavior based on the N thema will emerge, etc., possibly ad
infinitum, possibly to some final end.
It hypothesizes that each emerging ethical system after the first amoral
stage, has a basic thema with specific values as to what is right and wrong in
behavior stemming from this thema.
In particular circumstances each ethical system may emphasize some
values of
the thema and may minimize other values.
Each ethical system may, if conditions are right, develop its normally
preprogrammed form or it may, depending on conditions, become a monstrum in excessu or a monstrum in defectu.
The theory proposes, also, that the N system of ethics always follows
the M system with the O system to follow the N and the P system to follow O,
etc.
But the theory allows for variation from the M to N thema.
It does propose that in the
beginning of man’s emergence from animal like to human-like behavior the first
ethical thema by which we will live will be M.
But, it proposes also, that in
another set of life circumstances, at the same level of emergence that M thema
will be particularized as M-1, a variant on the thema M.
These thematic variations must be
hypothesized to be consistent with the concept of dynamic brain systems because
dynamic systems consist of sub-family dynamic systems wherein each is in
contact with all other dynamics systems.
Thus, the intellectual system, the
motivation system, the feeling system, the perceptual system and the ethical
system are all in contact.
Therefore, if changes in one are not
sufficient to restructuralize thoroughly the others, the resultant is a
variation on the thema of the moment rather than the emergence of a new thema.
And, new thema emerge only if the
change in one system is so great as to restructuralize all others.
An example of the latter would be the arisal of new intellectual
insights to enable certain humans to make the problem of survival relatively
assured. Such a change, in a dynamic family, would be sufficient to
spontaneously reorganize all other sub-families and would be sufficient to move
those humans to the next ethical developmental stage.
All of the previous ideas as to what is right in behavior and what is
wrong in behavior do not necessarily change as man’s ethical concepts evolve
from the M thema and later in time to the O thema.
Not all values change. Some of the specific values of the B-M system of
ethics will remain as part of the C-N system. Also, when the D-O system of
ethics arises, there will be carry over of B-M values
but the amount of carry over of B-M values will be less in the D-O system than
in the C-N system.
Thus it is hypothesized that there
are values good for man when he is operating at a particular dynamic level,
values which are good for man at any time, in any place, in any circumstance.
But, there are two further aspects of this theory, the most complicated
aspects of all which are yet to be covered.
They derive from the principles of primary and recency in human behavior
and from the conception of monstrum in excessu, monstrum in defectu, and the possibility of perfection of a system.
Thus emergent ethical theory
hypothesizes that ethical behavior develops with time and conditions through a
definable series of stages.
The stages are seen as pre-programmed in a somewhat MacDougalian
instinctive sense. Each stage is dependent for its emergence, upon certain
Dynamical states in the brain which are released by certain life circumstances.
It represents that when certain phenomenological conditions arise in the life
of a person, a clan, a society or possibly a nation that a certain form of
ethical behavior will be associated with these phenomenological conditions.
The early appearing ethical system may have primacy over later appearing
systems and thus the more recent system may be a modification of the earlier
until the earlier has run almost its entire course, and until the earlier
becomes, eventually, functionally subordinated in the broader thema of the more
recently appearing ethic.
To clarify this, let us hypothesize that the first four themata are:
the sacrificial thema,
the might-is-right thema,
the togetherness thema and
the materialistic thema
The thema of sacrifice will dominate the first three ethical levels. At
the first level it would be sacrifice of all for the good of all, at the second
level it would be sacrifice of many for the good of the few and at the third
level it would be sacrifice for the sake of one’s own group.
But, by the time man is reaching for the fourth level ethic, this large,
three sub-system sacrificial or altruistic ethic would
have had its day.
The pleasure to be derived from
the expression of the individual self which emerged
in the might-is-right of the few would increase during the days on stage of the
second and third level ethics.
By the time of the emergence of fourth level dynamics it would become
the dominating thema with the sacrificial thema functionally subordinated to
the self materialistic thema. This state of affairs would continue for each
subsequent emerging ethical thema.
The last basic point of this theory pertains to a particular aspect of
General Systems Theory.
Namely, the point that this theory allows one to think of systems which
develop toward states of greater heterogeneity and complexity while at the same
time one thinks of states which maintain, steady conditions moving without reorganization
to the ultimate of that particular state.
An ethical system in a man or group of men may not always move on to a
higher state of organization. If man is living at a low level of existence and
in the course of his life is unable to extricate himself from such
circumstances, then his ethical system would not reorganize and move on to
another level. It would move to the ultimate of the ethical state of affairs
for that system or the particularization of that system.
Thus, if the ethical system were the
might-is-right system, one might find the ultimate in defective might-is-right
ethics or the very best of might-is-right ethics that man could create.
With this point we come to the end of this sketch, and it is but a
sketch, of a model and theory offered for investigating ethical behavior. It
will be followed by a paper sketching other reasons why we need newer models of
ethical behavior and which also sketches out possible ethical systems.
But, before summarizing may I reinforce the opening sentence of this
paper. I do not propose that anything said herein is the truth about ethical
behavior. There may be something in what has been said, on the other hand,
there may be nothing of significance in these words, but be that as it may what
has been said is as follows:
It has been said that we must question whether we know what ethical
behavior is like, and we must question whether we know what is
the ethically mature decision maker.
Thus we asked: Can decisions of an ethically sensitive nature be made
when we do not know or understand ethical behavior? If one is to be ethically
sensitive, it would seem he must first have a reasonable comprehension of
ethical behavior but it was said also, that we may not have the knowledge
necessary for such comprehension.
It may be that our failure to solve
man’s problem is not so much that it is hard to get man to behave ethically or
that he is not ethically sensitive and thus not ethically mature.
It may be that we lack the necessary knowledge and it may be that we
lack the knowledge because adequate research models do not exist.
It may be that there is a large general system of behavior, which we can
point out as ethical behavior, within which are many relatively independent and
considerable unlike one another sub-systems of ethical behavior.
Possibly there are systems of ethical behavior each with its own
characteristic values and each with its own characteristic dynamics and perhaps
these are organized ethical sub-systems within the dynamics of some overall
general system of behavior.
It is possible that we may find that in certain periods of time, given a
man or men in a certain stage of development and living under certain
circumstances, that
a particular ethical system has to arise.
It may be that all ethical systems have some dynamic potential to move
toward some final or maybe even infinite state of affairs.
It may be that some are wrong today
who believe that the task of producing ethically mature decisions is the task
of learning how to direct people toward some a priori ethical set of beliefs.
Progress in ethical development may be movement from systems less open,
less dynamically complex, to systems more open, more dynamically complex.
We may need to identify the highly ordered main stations on the road to
some final or infinite ethical state.
We may have to learn how to extract people from a lower state of ethical
affairs, into a higher and higher and yet still higher state of ethical
affairs.
Perhaps we will never make ethically mature decisions until we learn
what values are a part of what ethical system and how
man moves from one set of ethical values to the next set of ethical values.
A view of ethical behavior from a systems point of view might lead one
to hypothesize that certain values are appropriate to certain systems of ethics
but that these same values might be inappropriate to other ethical systems.
Thus instead of the earlier ethical beliefs being immature, but quite
like later ethical beliefs, it may be that the later ethical values are quite
unlike the earlier ethical values.
And it may be that he who is living by an earlier ethical system cannot
conceive that a later system is possible or its values anything but wrong.
It may be that when we look at earlier ethical systems from within a
later ethical system, we will see that the earlier values, no matter how
appropriate in a later system, are not only appropriate to, but absolutely
necessary for living in the conditions which exist when that earlier system is
present. If any or some of these speculations are true, possible we can see why
we have problems in the region of ethical behavior.
Perhaps the way to achieve the ethically sensitive, ethically mature
decision maker is quite different from the ways being tried to produce such
today.
Or as Allport has said: "The
determinists are right in saying that the fabric of the world is structured and
orderly. But they are wrong in believing that the fabric of a given life has
reached its final form. The relative freedom of man lies in his seeking and
utilizing knowledge that will enable him to discover the final shape of his
life." (4, p. 564)
Clare W Graves 1959 – Schenectady, New York
From Wikipedia:
Clare W. Graves (December 21, 1914-January 3, 1986)
was a professor
of psychology
and originator of the Level Theory of Personality. He was born in New Richmond, Indiana.
Graves graduated from Union College in New York in
1940 and received his master's degree and a Ph.D in psychology from Western Reserve University in Cleveland,
Ohio.
In the mid-twentieth century, Clare W. Graves taught psychology
at Union College in Schenectady, New York. There he developed an epistemological
model of human psychology. Graves claimed that the inspiration for so
doing came from undergraduate students in his introductory psychology course.
He acknowledged that he was unable to answer the frequently asked question as
to who from among many competing psychology theorists was ultimately
"right" or "correct" with their model since there were
elements of truth and error in all of them….
